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Abstract
While instructional time is viewed as crucial to learning, little is known about the effective-
ness of reducing absences relative to increasing the number of school days. Using administrative
data from North Carolina public schools, this paper jointly estimates the effect of absences
and length of the school calendar on test score performance. We exploit a state policy that
provides variation in the number of school days prior to standardized testing and find substan-
tial differences between these two effects. Extending the school calendar by ten days increases
math and reading test scores by only 1.7% and 0.8% of a standard deviation, respectively. A
similar reduction in absences would lead to gains of 5.5% in math and 2.9% in reading. We
perform a number of robustness checks including utilizing flu data to instrument for absences,
family-year fixed effects, distinguishing between excused and unexcused absences, and control-
ling for a contemporaneous measure of student disengagement. Our results are robust to these
alternative specifications. In addition, our findings indicate considerable heterogeneity across
student ability, suggesting that targeting absenteeism among low performing students could aid
in narrowing current gaps in performance.
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1 Introduction
During the last decade, the U.S. federal government and many states have taken a series of
steps to improve educational outcomes in elementary, middle, and high school. To this end,
many programs have been implemented1 whose primary aim is to hold schools accountable for
the performance of their children. More recently, policy makers have renewed their attention
towards2 the actual number of days that students spend at school. For example, while the
federal government is aiming for an extension of the school calendar,3 many states and cities
have already increased the number of school days.4 Despite these initiatives, little is known
about the effectiveness of this type of interventions relative to other possible competing policies.
For instance, reducing absenteeism may constitute an alternative avenue for policy as it would
target specific students who would benefit the most from being in the classroom. Indeed, there
is significant room for improving student attendance; Balfanz and Byrnes (2012) estimate that
5 million to 7.5 million students are missing nearly a month of school. Absences are a pervasive
problem present at all schooling levels, even the initial ones. For example, at least 10 percent
of kindergartners and first graders miss 10 percent or more of the school year [see, Chang and
Romero (2008)]. The impact of these absences -even those in early grades- can have long term
effects; chronic absenteeism constitutes an early predictor of dropping out of school [see, Romero
and Lee (2007); Connolly and Olson (2012); Attendance Works & Healthy Schools Campaign
(2015)]. In addition, absences are costly for schools’ and districts’ budgets. For instance, in
California, absences cost public schools $3.5 billion in state funding based on daily attendance
between 2010/11 and 2012/13 [see, Harris (2014)]. Given these large costs, recent initiatives
have been designed to reduce chronic absenteeism such as “NYC Success Mentor Corps”5 and
“WakeUp! NYC”6 which were recently launched in New York City.7
1For example, the federal government implemented No Child Left Behind beginning in 2001 and North Carolina
introduced Accountability for Basic skills and for local Control (ABCs) in 1997.
2In 1983, the report “A Nation at Risk” issued by the National Commission on Education Excellence, compared
the U.S. school year of 180 days to the longer school calendars in Europe (190 to 210 days) as justification for an
increase in school time.
3In 2009, President Obama said that the “challenges of a new century demand more time in the classroom” (The
New York Times, August 22, 2011). Similarly, the U.S. Secretary of Education, Arne Duncan has stated that “the
school day is too short, the school week is too short, and the school year is too short” (Time Magazine, April 15,
2009).
4North Carolina recently added five days to the public school calendar.
5The NYC Success Mentor Corps is a research-based, data-driven mentoring model that seeks to improve at-
tendance, behavior, and educational outcomes for at-risk students in low-income communities citywide. For more
information see http://www.nyc.gov/html/truancy/downloads/pdf/nyc success mentor.pdf
6Students receive phone calls with pre-recorded wake up messages from Magic Johnson, Jose Reyes, and Mark
Texeira, among others.
7According to Balfanz and Byrnes (2013), these programs constitute cost-efficient strategies. They found that
students in poverty at schools that were targeted by these initiatives were 15% less likely to be chronically absent than
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In this regard, the goal of this paper is to quantify the relative effectiveness of reducing
absences with respect to extending the school calendar on test score performance based on a
sample of elementary school students. While most studies have analyzed the importance of
absences or days of class separately,8 this analysis provides an approach that allows for both
effects to be examined simultaneously. We believe that, from a policy perspective this is key,
given that extending the school year or reducing absences are likely to affect students at different
margins. For example, missing a day of school due to an absence may be more detrimental to
a student’s performance since they will need to make up for missed work later. Moreover,
catching up is likely to be more difficult for low performing students, resulting in larger gaps
in academic performance within the classroom. To examine possible heterogeneous effects of
absences and days of class, we analyze whether children from relatively low income families, or
those who perform poorly, benefit comparatively more from spending increased time at school.
Similarly, we try to identify whether the loss of a school day has differential effects depending on
the school grade, and whether absences’ effects persist in subsequent school years. We believe
that providing a detailed analysis of heterogeneous effects will inform the policy discussion in
terms of identifying specific groups of the population that may benefit the most from particular
interventions. Finally, we investigate the effect of teacher and school quality on absences. We
study to what extent attending (having) a better school (teacher) could lead to a decrease in
the number of days absent.
Contrary to most of the literature that has considered countries, states, counties, or schools as
the unit of analysis,9 we make use of detailed longitudinal data at the individual level from North
Carolina public schools. This allows us to control for students’, teachers’, and schools’ observable
and unobservable characteristics. Therefore, this paper is able to analyze the importance of time
spent at school from several perspectives (i.e. absences and days of class), as well as to implement
a rigorous econometric strategy to address problems of endogeneity in a number of ways. In
order to deal with the various threats to identification, such as health shocks, disengagement
effects, and omitted variable bias, we employ several different identification strategies. First, we
use previous year test scores, student, teacher and school fixed effects, and measures of overall
school performance to control for heterogeneity. Second, we control for a contemporaneous
measure of student disengagement (i.e. school suspensions). Third, we utilize flu data at the
county level to instrument for absences. Fourth, we employ family-year fixed effects to account
similar students at comparison schools. Moreover, they show that those who exited chronic absenteeism experienced
significant improvements in their academic performance, leading to important reductions in dropout rates.
8See Section 2 for a discussion of the related literature.
9For example, Lee and Barro (2001), Pischke (2007), and Marcotte and Hemelt (2008), among others.
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for any time-varying family specific shocks. Finally, we examine unexcused absences to take
into account any illnesses or other excused events that may affect both absences and grades.10
Reassuringly, our results are consistent across specifications.
Estimating models with three-way high-dimensional fixed effects when the sample size is
large is not a trivial matter. In our case, it requires to estimate an extremely large number of
parameters11 (i.e. 701,166 students; 33,051 teachers; and 1,364 schools), therefore an iterative
algorithm is implemented in order to overcome computational issues.
Results show substantial differences between the effect of absences and days of class on test
score performance. Our preferred specification indicates that extending the school calendar by
ten days would increase math and reading test scores by 1.7% and an insignificant 0.8% of a
standard deviation, respectively,12 while a similar reduction in absences would lead to an increase
of 5.5% in math and of 2.9% in reading scores.13 Estimation results show that absences have
an even larger negative effect among low performing kids, suggesting that the costs of catching
up are higher among those who show greater difficulties at school. In addition, we analyze
whether spending more time at school (i.e. fewer absences or a longer academic calendar) has
a larger effect on students in later grades. While being ten days absent in grade 3 leads to
a decrease of 2% of a standard deviation in math test scores, in grade 5 the effect is 8.1%.
Moreover, we present evidence indicating persistent effect of absences in subsequent grades,
particularly in math. Finally, we show that attending (having) a school (teacher) in the 75th
percentile of the fixed effect distribution decreases absences by 0.14 (0.14) days relative to the
25th percentile; a relatively large result given that the average number of absences is 6.28 days.14
Overall, the results point towards the presence of an important asymmetry between the effects
of expanding total time spent at school through a reduction of absences or through an extension
of the school calendar. However, we should emphasize that expanding or missing instructional
time in elementary school are likely to have different implications than, for example, in college.
Therefore, these findings should be circumscribed to students that are attending the first years
of their schooling careers.
10Excused absences are those that are originated by an illness or injury; quarantine; medical appointment; death in
the immediate family; called to court under subpoena or court order; religious observance; educational opportunity
(prior approval is needed); local school board policy; absence related to deployment activities. A student’s absence
from school for any reason other than those previously listed is considered as an unexcused absence.
11Given that part of our empirical strategy makes use of all fixed effects in a later analysis, we need to recover all
the fixed effect parameters (i.e. demeaning the sample is not a feasible alternative in this case).
12Sims (2008) also finds no significant effect on reading scores.
13The magnitude of these effects are approximately one-third of the size of a one standard deviation increase in
teacher effectiveness. (Hanushek and Rivkin, 2010).
14These calculations are based on the fixed effects from the math test score regression.
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The financial resources required to extend the school calendar are large due to the high
fixed cost of operating a school.15 This fact combined with our findings showing a larger
effect of absences than days of class on test score performance are likely to have important
policy implications. While policymakers in many countries are discussing changes to the school
calendar,16 making better use of the existing time schemes by reducing absences constitutes
an avenue for policy that deserves greater attention. A possible (inexpensive) example of an
intervention that reduces absences is the Education Act of 1996 in the United Kingdom. This
policy empowers head teachers to issue Penalty Notices for unauthorized absences from school.
This means that when a pupil has five or more days of unauthorized absences in any term (where
no acceptable reason has been given for the absence), or if their child persistently arrives late for
school after the close of registration, their parents or guardians may receive a Penalty Notice of
£60 if paid within 21 days, rising to £120 if paid within 28 days. A report on the effectiveness
of these fines [Crowther and Kendall (2010)], found that 79% of local authorities said penalty
notices were “very successful” or “fairly successful” in improving school attendance.17 Finally, an
alternative path to reduce absenteeism has been suggested by Cuffe, Bignell, and Waddell (2014),
who show that increasing participation in extracurricular activities (e.g. athletic competitions)
leads to a reduction in unexcused absences for high schoolers.18
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 places our work in context with
the related literatures on student absences and school length. Section 3 details the data used
in the empirical analysis. Section 4 outlines the econometric strategy. Section 5 describes the
results. Section 6 presents a series of robustness checks. Section 7 examines the heterogeneous
effects of absences and days of class by several student characteristics. Section 8 concludes.
15Many calculations indicate that a ten percent increase in time would require a six to seven percent increase in
cost (Chalkboard Project (2008), Silva (2007)), this would approximately imply an increase of $527 dollars per pupil
in North Carolina.
16For example, France has recently extended the length of the school week. See “French Plan to Add to Already
Lengthy School Days Angers Parents and Teachers,” The New York Times, February 11th, 2013.
17Given that for the sample we analyze (i.e. students in grades 3 to 5), parents play a key role in whether or not
their child(ren) will attend school, penalty notices are expected to have an effect on reducing unexcused absences.
18It is important to distinguish between policies that aim to increase overall attendance from those that try to
inhibit chronic absenteeism. While increasing participation in athletic competitions or implementing penalty notices
likely intend to promote overall student attendance, programs such as the NYC Success Mentor Corps (see footnote
5) mainly target chronic absenteeism on a specific group of students. The study of the relative effectiveness of these
type of polices is a matter that goes beyond the scope of this paper.
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2 Background
The length of the school year and a student’s total number of absences combine to determine
the total amount of instructional time a student receives in a given year. Despite this, their
effects on student performance have largely been examined independently; likely due to the lack
of available data on absences and the limited variability on school year length.
2.1 Absences
A common finding in the literature is that students with greater attendance than their classmates
perform better on standardized achievement tests, and that schools with higher rates of daily
attendance tend to have students who perform better on achievement tests than do schools with
lower daily attendance rates [Roby (2004); Sheldon (2007); Caldas (1993)]. These correlations
present a challenge in estimating the effect of absences on student performance; more able and
motivated students are both more likely to attend school and to perform well in their courses
and on standardized tests. Therefore, without adequate controls for personal characteristics,
part of any estimated effects of absences will reflect a downward ability bias due to endogenous
selection.
The literature has addressed this issue in a variety of ways. Devadoss and Foltz (1996) used
survey responses to obtain information on student effort and motivation. Dobkins, Gil, and
Marion (2010) exploited data generated from a mandatory attendance policy for low-scoring
college students. Stanca (2006), Martins and Walker (2006), and Arulampalam, Naylor, and
Smith (2012) also examined college student attendance utilizing panel data to try to control
for unobserved characteristics correlated with absence, finding that attendance does matter for
academic achievement. However, missing a school day at university level may have substantially
different effects than in elementary school.
Fewer studies have exploited panel data to examine the effects of absences at the elemen-
tary school level. Notable exceptions include Gershenson, Jacknowitz, and Brannegan (2014),
Goodman (2014), and Gottfried (2009; 2010; 2011).19 However, relative to these papers, we
are able to jointly control for student, teacher, and school fixed effects.20 School fixed effects
enable us to control for the common influences of a school by capturing systematic differences
19Gershenson, Jacknowitz, and Brannegan (2014) and Gottfried (2009; 2011) find results similar to ours.
20While Gershenson, Jacknowitz, and Brannegan (2014), Goodman (2014) and, Gottfried (2009; 2011) also control
for school fixed effects, family fixed effects or classroom fixed effects, none of them jointly account for student, teacher,
and school fixed effects. Due to the large number of fixed effects that we aim to recover estimating this model is not
trivial. In this regard, we implement an interative fixed effect estimator that circumvents the data dimensionality
problem (see Section 4).
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across institutions.21 This includes curriculum, hiring practices, school neighborhood, and the
quality of leadership. Teacher fixed effects control for the common influences of a given teacher,
and student fixed effects control for student observed and unobserved heterogeneity. We are
also able to identify siblings, allowing us to control for family-year fixed effects combined with
previous year test scores.22 This controls for family-specific shocks such as a death in the family
or divorce when estimating the effect of absences.
We utilize North Carolina flu data to instrument for absences and we also examine a spec-
ification that includes controls for a contemporaneous measure of student disengagement.23
Goodman (2014) uses snowfall amounts in Massachusetts to identify the effect of time spent at
school on test score performance. However, his findings in math are substantially larger than
the ones shown in this paper. For example, in his preferred specification, he finds that ten
days of absences induced by bad weather reduce math achievement by 50% of a standard devi-
ation, while our findings range between 5% and 10% of a standard deviation depending on the
specification.24 Finally, he finds that school closure due to snowfall has no effect on test score
performance, while we find positive and significant effects of an extra day of class. Differences
in the results may be due to several factors. First, we control for a larger set of fixed effects (i.e.
student, teacher and school fixed effects). Second, we use flu data to instrument for absences,
while he uses snowfall, leading to possible different local average treatment effects. Third, the
marginal absence providing identification in Goodman (2014) is one induced by bad weather;
which is not likely to be the main driver of student absences like it could be illness. Fourth,
instructional loss due to weather is unlikely to be totally exogenous. In Massachusetts, snow is
a normal winter occurrence and as such, schools may already be accounting for cold weather
related absences when setting their yearly school calendar. Finally, certain features of the North
Carolina data make this database more suitable for this type of analysis than the Massachusetts
data. Namely, administrative records in Massachusetts provide data on days absent and number
of school days for the whole school year, rather than until the day of the exam, as is the case for
our sample; and schools in Massachusetts can endogenously reschedule test dates in reaction to
winter conditions, while North Carolina does not reschedule end of grade (EOG) testing.25
2119.16% of students that are in the sample for more than one year are observed at multiple schools.
22Gottfried (2011) also employs a family-year fixed effect approach in analyzing student performance in the School
District of Philadelphia.
23Other studies implement alternative instruments. For example, Gottfried (2010) uses distance from school to
identify the effect of attendance on test scores and finds a positive relationship.
24His results without instrumenting for absences and incorporating student fixed effects are smaller, although still
larger than our results (approximately 30% larger than our preferred specification).
25These different features of the data could explain why he did not find positive statistical effects of an extra day
of class while we do find positive effects.
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2.2 Length of the School Year
A number of previous studies have examined the effects of length of the school year on student
achievement. Several studies on school quality in the United States include term length as one
of the regressors [see, e.g., Grogger (1996) and Eide and Showalter (1998)] but typically find
insignificant effects. The biggest stumbling block to uncovering the impact of school days on stu-
dent performance is the lack of variation in the total number of school days in an academic year.
We overcome this problem thanks to a specific North Carolina policy that provides variation in
the number of instructional days across schools before the day of the exam.26
Most studies examining the length of the school year use state or country level data [see,
e.g., Card and Krueger (1992); Betts and Johnson (1998); Lee and Barro (2001)]. Card and
Krueger (1992) and Betts and Johnson (1998) found positive and significant effects of length
of the school year on earnings for birth cohorts in the first half of the 20th century, which had
more variability in the number of school days.27 Lee and Barro (2001) utilized cross-country
data and examined the correlation of student performance and measures of school resources,
including the number of class days. They found that more time in school increased mathematics
and science scores, but lowered scores in reading, which is largely consistent with our findings
for math; however, we find a positive effect on reading. Differently from previous papers, we
are able to use within school variation in days of class. Moreover, we use microlevel data at
the student level which allows us to explore policy relevant heterogeneous effects of increasing
school days.
Other studies have exploited quasi-experimental variation to identify the effect of additional
days of class. Marcotte and Hemelt (2008) examined the effect of fewer days of class resulting
from snow-related school closures on test score performance and found that the pass rate for
third grade math and reading assessments falls by more than a half percent for each school day
lost due to an unforeseen closure. Hansen (2011) examined both school closures due to weather
in Colorado and Maryland as well as state-mandated changes in test-date administration in
Minnesota. He found that in both cases more instructional time prior to test administration
increases student performance. Pischke (2007) utilized variation introduced by the West-German
short school years in 1966-67, which exposed some students to a total of about two-thirds of
a year less of schooling while enrolled. He found that the short school years increased grade
26More specifically, North Carolina allows for flexibility in the setting of the testing date, which is when academic
achievement is measured. See Section 3 for a more detailed discussion.
27Card and Krueger (1992) presented additional results including a state fixed effect; the positive effect of term
length vanished within states and conditional on other school quality variables.
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repetition in primary school and led to fewer students attending higher secondary school tracks.28
Relative to Pischke, we examine a smaller change in the number of days of class; however, it is of
the approximate size considered by policy makers.29 Finally, Fitzpatrick, Grissmer, and Hastedt
(2011) exploit quasi-randomness in the timing of assessment dates to examine the effect of days
of class on test score performance in kindergarten. Their estimates suggest that an additional
day of school results in gains of about 0.05 standard deviations in both reading and math test
scores. However, as in Pischke (2007), the time gap in tests they exploit for their analysis is
larger (i.e. some students had only 60 days of class until the day of the exam while others had
over 200).
Our paper is most similar to Sims (2008), who studied the effect of days of class, using the
implementation of a Wisconsin state law that restricted districts to start dates after September
1st to identify the effects of this extra time on student achievement. He found that an additional
week of class was associated with an increase of 0.03 standard deviations in math scores for
fourth graders, but he found no effect on average reading and language scores. We find smaller
effects of additional days on scores. This difference can be attributed to our use of a different
econometric strategy and of individual level data.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Data
The North Carolina education data is a rich, longitudinal, administrative data set that links
information on students, teachers, and public schools over time. This database is maintained
by the North Carolina Education Research Data Center (NCERDC), which is housed at Duke
University.
Students in North Carolina have to take (standardized) exams in math and reading at the
end of the school year, with the aim to assess whether they have met grade-level expectations.30
Performance in these tests is comparable across time and grades through the use of a develop-
mental scale, where each point on this scale measures the same amount of learning. For example,
a student who shows identical growth on this scale in two consecutive grades is interpreted as
having learned equal amounts in each year.31 Due to this institutional setting, our longitudinal
28Pischke (2007) found no effect on earnings.
29In North Carolina, the school year was recently extended by 5 days. In contrast, Pischke’s findings are due to a
change in about 100 days of schooling.
30All students in North Carolina take the same test conditional on school grade.
31Tests are administered by the classroom teacher, while the test coordinator (who is chosen by the superintendent
9
database provides information on mathematics and reading test scores for each student in ele-
mentary,32 middle, and high school. Since the availability of some of the data varies over time,
the analysis is restricted to the years 2006 to 201033 and grades 3 to 5.34 The nature of the
dataset makes it possible to track the progress of an individual student over their educational
careers and link students to their teachers35 and school in each year, provided they stay within
the universe of North Carolina public schools.
NCERDC records also include extensive information on student, teacher, and school char-
acteristics. Data on students include ethnicity, gender, whether or not they participated in the
federal free and reduced price lunch subsidy program, geocoded address, number of days sus-
pended from school, days in membership and absences. Days in membership is used to calculate
the number of days of class prior to the exam.36 It is defined as the number of days the student
was on the roster in a particular school; a student is in membership even when absent. Note
that days in membership only includes days of instruction, but not designated teacher work
days.37 Absences data include both the total number of days, as well as disaggregated data by
excused and unexcused absences. All absences and days in membership data are collected at
the time of end of grade (EOG) testing.
Only counts of days absent are provided for each student and each academic year; it is not
possible to specifically discern when a student was absent. The NCERDC data categorizes
absences as either excused or unexcused; excused absences are defined as the ones due to illness
or injury; quarantine; medical appointment; death in the immediate family; called to court
under subpoena or court order; religious observance; educational opportunity (prior approval is
needed); local school board policy; absence related to deployment activities. All other absences
are categorized as unexcused.38 Aside from the distinction between excused and unexcused
of the district) oversees the grading, which is done at the local education agency level.
32More specifically, for grades 3 and above. Students in lower grades do not take end of grade (EOG) tests. Pupils
in grades 4 to 5 are tested only at the end of the academic year (i.e. May or June). However, students in grade 3
take the “previous year/baseline” test at the beginning of the academic year, and the EOG test in May or June of
that same academic year.
33School years are referred to by the year the school year ended. For example, the 2005/06 school year is year 2006.
34Younger students are less likely to skip school without parental knowledge, limiting issues of endogeneity. In
addition, students in upper grades can take courses with multiple teachers, making the estimation of teacher fixed
effects problematic.
35The data does not identify student’s teachers directly, but rather identifies the individual who administered the
end of grade exams. In elementary school, classrooms are largely self-contained with the classroom teacher proctoring
the exam.
36In practice, days of class is the modal days in membership at the school level.
37This implies, for example, that days that a school (or district) sets aside for teacher training in which students
have the day off are not considered as days of class. However, if a teacher is absent to attend a training course, a
substitute would fill in for the teacher and it would be counted as a day of class.
38More information on North Carolina’s attendance policies can be found at:
http://www.ncpublicschools.org/docs/fbs/accounting/manuals/sasa.pdf.
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absences, no further details are provided as to the reason for the absence.39
In addition to the main sample, the sample of students who are siblings is also employed.
Following Caetano and Macartney (2013), the geocoded address data are used to identify stu-
dents living in the same household to create a family identifier. Two or more children who
share the same home address in a given academic year are considered to be part of the same
household. Even if the address changed between years, as long as the students remain together
at the new address, they are considered to be members of the same household. As a result, the
ability to observe children’s addresses as they progressed through elementary school makes it
possible to identify family-year fixed effects.
Teachers that are matched with less than five students are not included in an effort to avoid
special education (or other specialty) classes as well as minimize sampling error when estimating
fixed effects. Moreover, teachers with more than 30 students in a school year are excluded due
to possible data miscoding.40 The total number of student-year observations for 2006-2010 is
more than 1,302,000 while the total number of teachers included is more than 33,000.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive information on the sample of students in grades 3 to 5. Students
are absent on average 6.28 days of school prior to the exam. Figure 1 depicts the distribution
of absences in the data. While the distribution is centered around five days of class, a sizable
proportion of students are absent for much longer; 25% percent of students miss nine days (just
under two weeks) of class and 10% miss 13 days or more, each year, prior to the day of the
exam. Interpretation of results typically focuses on the effect of the average number of absences
on performance. However, it is important to recognize that, for a sizable share of the sample,
reducing absences would have a much larger impact.
North Carolina has an ethnically diverse student body with 25.9% of students identifying
as black and over 10% as Hispanic. Relative to the United States in the 2010 Census, North
Carolina has a greater share of black school-age children and a slightly smaller Hispanic pop-
ulation. Males and females are equally represented in the data. Just under half of elementary
school students are eligible for the free or reduced price lunch subsidy program, a measure of
low-income status. In addition, 13.98% of students are categorized as special education students
and 7% are classified as having limited english proficiency. Finally the proportion of students
39Note that number of excused and unexcused absences are attached to the students records (i.e. exam scores).
40Teachers can be followed over many periods. Therefore, we can know, for example, whether they have changed
schools or not.
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that has ever been suspended is 6.79%, where the average length of suspension is 3.18 days.
Note that North Carolina ranks third nationally in the rate of school suspensions behind South
Carolina and Delaware.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for North Carolina Public School Students, Grades 3-5
Mean s.d.
Days Absent 6.28 5.66
Days of Class 166.17 3.61
Suspensions:
Ever Suspended (%) 6.79 25.16
Days Suspended* 3.18 4.22
Race (%):
White 55.93 49.65
Black 25.86 43.79
Hispanic 10.60 30.79
Asian 2.38 15.24
Other 5.23 22.26
Gender (%):
Male 50.21 50.00
Female 49.79 50.00
Other characteristics (%):
Free/reduced lunch eligible 47.90 49.96
Special education 13.98 34.68
Limited english proficiency 7.04 25.58
N 1,302,037
Source: NCERDC, 2006-2010. End of grade test scores are standardized by year and grade level. The sample is
based on students having required test scores and total absences information, and are linked to a teacher with at
least 5 and no more than 30 students. Final analytical samples also require non-missing information for all included
variables.
*Conditional on suspension.
As younger students are less likely to skip school without parental knowledge, by limiting
the sample of analysis to grades 3 to 5 we are able to minimize issues related to this source
of endogeneity.41 In addition, students in these grades are more likely to enjoy self-contained
classrooms and therefore the link between teachers and students is more reliable as compared
to those in higher grades.
Researchers have demonstrated that students with greater attendance than their classmates
perform better on standardized achievement tests, and that schools with higher rates of daily
attendance tend to have students who perform better on achievement tests than do schools
with lower daily attendance rates [Roby (2004); Sheldon (2007)]. Table 2 examines absences by
41In the NCERDC data, middle school students do exhibit slightly more absences, driven largely by a greater
number of the unexcused type.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Absences
student characteristics, including quintile of last year’s prior math score. Students with lower
prior year test scores generally have a greater number of absences. This result is largely driven
by unexcused absences, which exhibits a stronger negative relationship with lagged math test
scores.42 This suggests that students who are less capable are also more likely to miss school.
Simple ordinary least squares (OLS) will therefore result in biased coefficient estimates; without
adequate controls, part of any estimated effects of absences will reflect a downward ability bias
due to endogenous selection.
Table 2 also highlights racial and gender differences in total number of absences as well as
their distribution between excused and unexcused types. White students have a greater number
of absences than other racial groups with an average of 6.73 days a year. Blacks and Hispanics
are absent 5.72 and 5.42 days respectively. However, a greater share of absences are excused for
white students relative to both the other two racial groups. Males have slightly more absences
than do females due to a greater number of unexcused absences. There does not appear to be
any time trend in absences.
Although students may have varying quantities of instructional time prior to EOG tests
resulting from absences, schools also differ in the number of actual class days prior to exam
administration. During the sample period, the Department of Education mandated 180 days
42This pattern holds when examining absences relative to prior reading score.
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Table 2: Average Number of Absences
Total Absences Excused Absences Unexcused Absences
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d
Grades 3-5
Average: 6.28 5.66 3.55 4.30 2.41 3.40
Prior Math Score:
Lowest Quintile 6.91 6.28 3.62 4.51 3.08 4.01
Second Quintile 6.43 5.83 3.60 4.36 2.67 3.56
Third Quintile 6.24 5.59 3.65 4.35 2.39 3.28
Fourth Quintile 5.96 5.28 3.62 4.19 2.10 2.95
Highest Quintile 5.50 4.92 3.40 4.02 1.72 2.55
Sex:
Male 6.34 5.73 3.55 4.32 2.47 3.46
Female 6.21 5.59 3.54 4.27 2.35 3.33
Race:
Asian 4.06 4.33 2.16 3.25 1.46 2.52
Black 5.72 5.68 2.59 3.75 2.79 3.84
Hispanic 5.42 5.06 2.60 3.54 2.63 3.50
White 6.73 5.70 4.22 4.56 2.20 3.13
Year:
2006 6.34 5.80 3.64 4.40 2.43 3.43
2007 6.66 5.87 3.54 4.51 2.20 3.34
2008 6.20 5.68 3.68 4.23 2.50 3.44
2009 5.87 5.40 2.91 3.59 2.73 3.46
2010 6.32 5.54 3.19 3.72 2.61 3.19
Source: NCERDC, 2006-2010. Samples are based on students having required test scores and total absences
information and are linked to a teacher with at least 5 and no more than 30 students. The sum of excused and
unexcused absences do not sum to total absences as absence counts by type are only available for approximately
two-thirds of the student-year observations. When missing, absences by type are generally missing at the school,
rather than student, level.
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Figure 2: Variation in Days of Class across Schools
of class.43 However, the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction dictates a window
of time for exam administration with the specific testing date chosen by the local education
agency (LEA).44 As a result, students at different schools may have had a differing number of
instructional days at the time academic performance was measured, as can be seen in Figure 2.45
While schools are not actually extending the school year, the number of instructional days prior
to the test are adjusted when the LEA sets the school’s EOG testing date.46,47 This variation
in instructional days,48 coupled with data on absences allows for the separate identification of
43Only two districts, Forsyth and Guilford Counties, had additional days of class.
44http://www.ncpublicschools.org/accountability/calendars/archive lists the testing windows for all tests adminis-
tered in North Carolina since 2001. A LEA in North Carolina is typically a county.
45Figure 3 in appendix A shows variation in days of class within school over time. Given that the econometric
strategy makes use of school fixed effects, this is the relevant variation in our analysis.
46The North Carolina Department of Public Instruction provides a testing window during which schools administer
the end of grade exams, giving some flexibility as to when schools test their students. School district authorities (not
the school principal) are responsible for setting the testing dates (within the testing window) for a given school.
Therefore, given this institutional setting and the fact that our empirical strategy includes several controls for peers
and schools’ lagged performance in addition to school, teacher and students fixed effects, we believe that our estimates
on the effect of days of class do not to suffer from omitted variable bias.
47The fact that the North Carolina Department of Public Instruction dictates a window of time for exam admin-
istration leads to some concerns regarding cheating (i.e. schools that take the exam earlier may provide information
about the test to schools that take it later). While NC public school system has adopted many measures to avoid this
type of behavior, it is difficult to completely rule out this possibility. However, if cheating was driving our results,
then we would expected large effects on days of class (i.e. taking the exam later), but this is not the case as we show
in the results section.
48The number of days of class prior to the EOG exam varies between 158 and 180 days.
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the effect of absences from additional days of schooling.49
4 Methodology
The data enables us to observe the EOG test scores, the number of class days, and the absences
of students in each year for grades 3 to 5 until the day of the test. Our primary aim is to estimate
the causal effect of both an absence and an additional day of instruction on performance. The
number of instructional days prior to the exam varies across schools and years and therefore
enables the identification of the effect of absences separately from additional instructional time.
In analyzing the effect of absences on performance, there are potential problems of endo-
geneity bias. As shown in Table 2, more able and motivated students appear more likely to
both attend school and score highly in their courses and on standardized tests. Therefore,
without adequate controls, part of any estimated effects of absences will reflect a downward
bias due to endogenous selection. This bias could be minimized with good proxies for ability,
engagement/motivation, or other individual characteristics.50
Our first strategy to deal with the potential problem of omitted variable bias exploits the
panel properties of the data. Student fixed effects are used to control for all observed and
unobserved student characteristics that are constant over time. This potentially includes student
effort, motivation and ability, as well as familial factors such as parental willingness for their
child to miss school or their efforts to help with school work at home.
School fixed effects are also included in the model to control for the common influences of a
school by capturing systematic differences across institutions. These include curriculum, hiring
practices, school neighborhood, and the quality of leadership. These effects are identified by
teachers who switch schools during grades 3 through 5. Teacher fixed effects are included to
control for the common influences of a teacher. Finally, fixed effects for grade and year parse out
the effect of schools and teachers from other common influences that occur across the population
in a given year and for a given cohort.
The main equation of our model is:
yigkst “ β0 ` β1ait ` β2dist ` β3Xit ` β4Gig ` β5Tt ` β6Est ` αi ` θk ` δs ` igkst (1)
49The exam date is set at the beginning of the school year. Therefore, schools cannot extend the number of days
of class prior to the exam based on shocks that occur during the academic year.
50The data contain information on the students’ prior year test score which is also included in several specifications
of the model.
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where yigkst denotes the test score of student i, in grade g, teacher k, school s, and year t where
the test score is standardized by grade, year and subject. The explanatory variables of interest
are ait and dist; ait is the number of absences over the course of the school year up to the day
of the exam; dist is the number of days of instruction prior to the examination day. Xit is a
vector of student covariates, Gig are grade fixed effects, Tt are time fixed effects, and Est is a
vector that controls for average absences of peers (to account for spillover effects), proportion of
students in the school that achieved proficiency during the previous academic year, and average
performance of peers in the prior year. αi, θk, and δs denote student, teacher, and school fixed
effects respectively. Given the large number of student (701,166), teacher (33,051) and school
(1,364) fixed effects that we are trying to recover, estimating equation (1) is not trivial. In
this regard, we employ an iterative fixed-effects estimator introduced by Arcidiacono, Foster,
Goodpaster, and Kinsler (2012) to reduce the computational cost of estimating the multi-level
fixed effects model of student achievement.51.
A value-added model of student achievement is also implemented. The feature of including
a lagged achievement score at the individual level implies, according to the literature of teacher
value added [Todd and Wolpin (2003)], that it is no longer necessary to incorporate additional
measures of ability or previous years inputs (i.e. previous year test score serves as a sufficient
statistic for unobserved input histories).
5 Baseline Results
Table 3 presents the regression results for math and reading, based on Equation (1). Specifi-
cation (1) is a simple OLS regression of standardized test scores52 without any fixed effects or
controls for student ability. The coefficients on absences for both math and reading are negative,
significant and large in magnitude. However, since there are no controls for unobserved individ-
ual characteristics, which are in all probability negatively correlated with absences, the absolute
value of the coefficient is likely to be biased upward. We expect that once adequate controls are
included, the absolute value of this coefficient will decrease. Similarly, the coefficient of days of
class shows the opposite sign of what was hypothesized and it is likely to suffer from omitted
variable bias.
Specification (2) includes student fixed effects, thereby controlling for observed and unob-
served student characteristics that are constant over time. An additional absence results in
51Appendix B describes the algorithm that we use to estimate equation (1)
52Test scores are standardized at grade-year level.
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math (reading) scores declining by 0.67% (0.36%) of a standard deviation. Therefore, a student
with the average number of absences53 would see their math (reading) score decline by 4.21%
(2.26%) of a standard deviation. Additional days of class has a positive, but insignificant effect
on both math and reading performance. The inclusion of school fixed effects (specification (3))
has little effect on the magnitude of the coefficient of interest for either subject.54
Specification (4) includes three-way high-dimensional fixed effects and finds significant, al-
though slightly smaller coefficients on days absent relative to the previous specifications. Re-
ducing absences by the average (6.28 days) results in scores declining 3.58% and 1.95% of a
standard deviation respectively for math and reading. Additionally, the effect of days of class
on math test scores is now significant, although smaller in magnitude relative to absences, with
test scores increasing 0.38% of a standard deviation for an equivalent increase in school days.
In addition to the three-way high-dimensional fixed effects, specification (5), our preferred
specification, includes average peer absences (in order to capture possible spillover effects),
and more importantly, it incorporates controls for school lagged performance (i.e. average
performance of classmates on the previous year’s exam, and the percent of students in the
school who achieved proficiency in the prior academic year). The results show a similar pattern
as before, where the absolute effect of being absent is almost three times larger than the effect
of an extra day of class.55 Notice that the sample size decreases due to the addition of extra
controls (estimating specification (4) with the sample from specification (5) produces similar
results).
Specification (6) examines a model with lagged achievement, and teacher and school fixed
effects.56 The coefficient on days absent is slightly larger in magnitude relative to the preferred
specification; where reducing absences by the average results in scores declining by 4.77% and
2.45% of a standard deviation for math and reading respectively. The equivalent increase in
school days would increase math scores by 0.69% and reading scores by 1.07% of a standard
deviation. Finally, specification (7) mimics specification (6) but it adds the same three controls
as in specification (5) (i.e. average peer absences, average performance of classmates on the
previous year’s exam, and percent of students in the school who achieved proficiency in the
53The average student in grades 3-5 is absent 6.28 days of school.
54Table 13 (in appendix C) provides an alternative specification where number of days absent divided by days of
class is included as an independent variable. Results remain very similar.
55Results do not change if instead of controlling for average peer absences, we control for average lagged peer
absences.
56The sample size is smaller in this specification because, for a given year, we do not have data on previous year
test scores for students (except in grade 3). Running a specification with three-way high-dimensional fixed effects on
this sample provides similar results as the ones currently reported in specification 4 (i.e. the change in the sample
size is not driving the difference in results).
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prior academic year), which results in little change to the coefficients of interest.57
In summary, the absolute value of the effect of each additional absence on test scores appears
to be larger relative to an extra day of class.58 The fact that absences have a greater effect
on math achievement than on reading achievement is consistent with the general finding that
educational inputs and policy have relatively larger impact on math achievement [Hanushek and
Rivkin (2010); Jacob (2005); Rivkin, Hanushek, and Kain (2005)], perhaps because children are
more likely to be exposed to reading and literacy outside of school, particularly at home where
parents may be more apt to help their children learn and develop reading skills [Currie and
Thomas (2001)].
6 Robustness Checks
Despite the set of controls that have been included in Table 3 (i.e. student, teacher, and school
fixed effects, previous year test score, school lagged performance, peer absences, and free/reduced
price lunch status), our results may still be driven by confounding effects. For example, student
engagement may not be fixed over time or family/health shocks could affect absences and test
score performance in a way that may not be captured by our extensive set of controls. In this
section we provide a series of robustness checks.
6.1 Student Disengagement
The fact that students may lose interest in classroom activities during their schooling career
suggests that the dynamic component of this type of behavior cannot be captured by the addition
of student fixed effects. This may cause concern that our results for absences are in fact driven
by a correlation between “lack of interest in school” and the decision to not attend class. To this
end, we present several pieces of evidence that assess the importance of this potential threat to
our identification strategy.
First, recall that our sample corresponds to students from grades 3 to 5. Therefore, the
decision to be absent from school needs to be (at least tacitly) supported by their parents. This
57The number of observations in specification (5) is smaller than in specification (7) because we are additionally
controlling for student fixed effects.
58Given that the math and reading tests are common across schools and designed around the representative length
of the school calendar, then it is possible to argue that a more curriculum-independent test might have been needed
in order to pick up school calendar effects. While we cannot fully discard this possibility, many students in North
Carolina do not perform particularly well in the end of grade exams. For example, 26.4% of them do not even
achieve proficiency level. Therefore, it is apriori expected that more days of class should have an impact in test score
performance even if the test is not changed.
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Table 4: Student Disengagement Regression
Math Test Score Reading Test Score
Days Absent -0.0051*** -0.0049*** -0.0027*** -0.0025***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Suspensions -0.0057*** -0.0045**
(0.0014) (0.0021)
Student FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Teacher FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 364,448 364,448 364,448 364,448
Source: NCERDC, 2006-2008, grades 3-5. Dependent variable is standardized by grade and year. All specifications
include days of class and dummy variables for grade, year, and free/reduced lunch participation. Controls include
average absences of peers, proportion of students in the school that achieved proficiency in the previous academic
year, and lagged average performance of peers. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The
sample is smaller than our main estimating sample as suspensions are only available until year 2008 and for
approximately two-thirds of the student-year observations. Suspensions are generally missing at the school level.
Significance levels: ˚ ˚ ˚ denotes 1%; ˚˚ denotes 5%; ˚ denotes 10%.
suggests that endogeneity issues should be of less concern relative to a sample of high school
students.
Second, we include a proxy for student disengagement to our baseline specifications. More
specifically, total days suspended is added as a measure of misbehavior. The total days of
suspension is the sum of in-school and out-of-school suspensions.59 If student disengagement
is affecting our results, we should expect a decline in the effect of absences once controlling
for suspensions. Table 4 shows that the coefficients on absences are in fact fairly constant
across specifications. The first column for both math and reading corresponds to the baseline
specification in Table 3.60 For math (reading), the effect on absences only changes from -0.0051
(-0.0027) in our baseline specification to -0.0049 (-0.0025) after controlling for suspensions (see
columns 2 and 4).
Finally, we employ an instrumental variables approach, in which we instrument the number
of absences with data on flu outbreaks at the county level in North Carolina. The flu is a
contagious respiratory illness that affects all ages; however, school-aged children are the group
with the highest rates of flu illness.61 We use data from the North Carolina Disease Event
59In-school suspensions are usually served in an in-school suspension classroom. When a school does not have an
in-school suspension program or when offenses are more serious or chronic, they may be dealt with through short-
term, out-of-school suspensions. Long-term suspensions are more than ten days in length may be used for more
serious offenses and are served out-of-school. Approximately 6.79% of students in our sample have been suspended
at some point in time.
60The sample size is smaller as data on suspensions is only reported until 2008.
61Center for Disease Control, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/school/guidance.htm
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Tracking and Epidemiologic Collection Tool (NC DETECT) provided by the North Carolina
Division of Public Health62 which has been collecting the number of influenza-like illnesses (ILI)
affecting kids between the age of 5 and 12 years since January of 2008.63,64
In order for a measure of flu activity to be an appropriate instrument for absences, it must
be correlated with absences and only impact test score performance through missing days of
schooling. While one may be concerned that the flu has a direct impact on EOG scores, the
flu season commonly peaks in January, February, or March65 well before the EOG tests are
administered.66 Moreover, our data show low flu activity during the months exams take place.67
Therefore, this is not likely to be an important threat to our identification strategy. However,
even though our data correspond to flu cases in children between the ages of 5 and 12, a possible
concern is that flu outbreaks may also affect teacher attendance, and therefore may confound the
effects of student and teacher absences. Unfortunately, we only have data on teacher absences
due to sickness through the 2008 school year, while our data on flu outbreaks start in January of
2008. However, as we show in appendix D (Table 14), adding teacher sick days to our baseline
specification does not affect our coefficient on either days absent or school days.68 Furthermore,
it does not have a substantial effect on students’ performance. This result is consistent with the
fact that the availability of substitute teachers in North Carolina is likely to lessen the potential
harm from teacher absences.69
62NC DETECT is an advanced, statewide public health surveillance system. NC DETECT is funded with fed-
eral funds by North Carolina Division of Public Health (NC DPH), Public Health Emergency Preparedness Grant
(PHEP), and managed through a collaboration between NC DPH and the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill Department of Emergency Medicine’s Carolina Center for Health Informatics (UNC CCHI).
63ILI cases are reported by N.C. hospital emergency departments.
64More specifically, NC DETECT has provided the total number of ILI cases per month in each N.C. county
affecting kids between the age of 5 and 12 (the total number of counties in N.C. is 100). If the number of cases in a
given county-month data cell is greater than zero but less than ten, then the information is censored. We use multiple
imputation techniques [Royston (2007)] in order to deal with those values that we do not observe but we know are
in the range between one and nine visits. Results are similar, if instead of using multiple imputation techniques, we
just replace the censored values with specific numbers (i.e. one, five, or nine). Finally, we aggregate the data at the
academic year level (i.e. August to June). The resulting proportion of ILI cases that are imputed is small (i.e. 7.9%
across both the 2008/09 and 2009/10 seasons).
65According to CDC, in the last thirty years flu activity most often peaked in February (45% of the time), followed
by December, January and March (which each peaked 16% of the time). It has never peaked after March. Source:
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/season/flu-season.htm
66EOG tests are generally administered at the end of May or later. The inclusion of controls for ILI activity in
May and June in our baseline regressions do not alter the results.
676.3% of yearly flu visits occurred in May and 5.8% in June.
68The results do not change across specifications (with or without teacher sick days) but the coefficient on school
days becomes insignificant due to fewer years of data that we can use in this regression (i.e. only years 2006-2008),
therefore leading to less variability over time.
69Finally, another potential threat to identification is if students that get the flu are not a random subset of the
population due to the effect of the flu vaccine. However, the chances of showing flu symptoms after being vaccinated
are still large. CDC (Centers for Disease controls and Prevention) claims that an important role in determining the
likelihood that flu vaccine will protect a person from flu illness is the similarity or “match” between the flu viruses
the flu vaccine is designed to protect against and the flu viruses spreading in the community. More specifically, they
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We define the instrument as:
IVflu,c,yr “
¨˝ř
m
ILIc,m
Nc,yr
10,000
‚˛
where ILIc,m is the number of influenza-like illness cases in county c in month m (the analysis
uses data from August to June, which corresponds to the academic year) and Nc,yr is the number
of elementary school students in county c during the academic year yr.70 The IV then is the
number of ILI cases per 10,000 school-aged children.71,72
Table 5 shows the results of OLS (benchmark case) and IV regression specifications for math
and reading.73 Columns (2) and (4) indicate that the effect of absences after instrumenting with
flu outbreaks is larger than days of class.74,75 More specifically, a one day reduction in absences
would lead to increases of 1% and 1.8% of a standard deviation in math and reading (though
the coefficient in the math specification is not statistically significant), respectively. This is
approximately similar to our benchmark OLS specification result for math in column (1), but
the IV results for reading are almost five times larger than its corresponding benchmark (i.e.
-0.0182 compared to -0.0043). Given that IV recovers LATE effects, it is not surprising that the
magnitude of the coefficients is larger than in the OLS specifications.76
In summary, the fact that including suspensions and instrumenting absences with flu data
are not affecting our main results (i.e. the effect of absences is larger than that for days of class)
suggest that disengagement effects are not likely to be driving our results.
state that “during years when the flu vaccine is not well matched to circulating viruses, it’s possible that no benefit
from flu vaccination may be observed (...) Even during years when the vaccine match is very good, the benefits of
vaccination will vary across the population, depending on characteristics of the person being vaccinated and even,
potentially, which vaccine was used.” (Source: http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/qa/vaccineeffect.htm). In this regard,
according to CDC, vaccine effectiveness during the 2007/2008 season was only 37%.
70The number of elementary school students in a county is the sum of all students in grades K to 8, which generally
corresponds to ages 5 to 12.
71The IV variable is defined per 10,000 school-aged children to be consistent with the rest of the literature which
typically defines ILI rates per 10,000 or 100,000 population.
72Note that we are only instrumenting for number of days absent.
73All 2SLS specifications in this paper have very strong first stages (see Table 15 in appendix E). The coefficient on
the instrument has a p-value of 0.000 in all specifications. Figure 4 (in appendix E) shows the presence of substantial
variability in the number of flu cases across counties.
74The sample size is smaller than in previous specifications given that flu data is only available from 2008.
75The exam date is set at the beginning of the school year. Therefore, schools cannot extend the number of
instructional days prior to the exam in response to a severe flu season.
76For example, if compliers are students who benefit the most from attending school, then instrumental variables
estimates should exceed the fixed effects ones.
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Table 5: IV Regression
Math Math Reading Reading
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Days Absent
-0.0093˚˚˚
(0.0003)
-0.0102
(0.0121)
-0.0043˚˚˚
(0.0002)
-0.0182˚
(0.0097)
Days of Class
0.0003
(0.0006)
0.0003
(0.0006)
0.0038˚˚˚
(0.0004)
0.0041˚˚˚
(0.0005)
Specification OLS IV OLS IV
N 284,651 284,651 284,651 284,651
Source: NCERDC, 2009-2010, grades 3-5. Dependent variable is standardized by grade and year. All specifications
include lagged test score, lagged peer score, and lagged school percent proficient in the given subject as well as
dummy variables for grade, year, gender, race, and free/reduced-price lunch status. Notice that the sample size is
smaller because we only have flu data for the years 2009-2010. Columns (1) and (3) show OLS results (serving as a
benchmark case), while columns (2) and (4) show the IV regression results. Standard errors clustered at the
classroom-year level are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels: ˚ ˚ ˚ denotes 1%; ˚˚ denotes 5%; ˚ denotes
10%.
6.2 Family Shocks
Our baseline specifications thus far have been assuming that family shocks/inputs that are
correlated with absences and affect performance are constant across time and therefore the
inclusion of student fixed effects accounts for them. However, these estimates may still be
biased if there are potentially time varying unobserved family factors that may be influencing
both student absences and testing performance. As previously mentioned, we follow Caetano
and Macartney (2013) in utilizing the geocoded address data to construct a family identifier.
Table 6 incorporates a family-year fixed effect, which captures all observed and unobserved
characteristics that are common to a family-year and is identified off of differing incidence of
absences within a family in a given year.77 Lagged test score is incorporated in the specification
as a proxy for ability as that is likely to be different even across siblings. The family-year fixed
effects specification controls for any family shock, such as parental divorce or a death in the
family, that impacted both absences and test scores. Since siblings generally attend the same
school, the coefficient on days of class cannot be well identified. The coefficient on absences in
Table 6 indicates that an additional absence decreases scores by 0.70% and 0.37% of a standard
deviation for math and reading respectively, which is similar to our previous findings from Table
77The information in the data does not provide the biological relationship between children living in the same
household. Regardless, since the students are residing in the same household and are therefore exposed to shared
family characteristics, children living at the same address will be considered family. There are 38,074 sibling groups
that are observed in grades 3-5 in the same year. For those sibling groups of size two (93% of the siblings sample)
observed in the same year, the mean absolute value of the difference in days absent is 3.32 days, with a standard
deviation of 3.95 days.
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Table 6: Siblings Fixed Effects Regression
Math Score Reading Score
Days Absent -0.0070*** -0.0037***
(0.0006) (0.0007)
Sibling Year FE Yes Yes
Lagged Student Score Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
N 104,831 104,831
Source: NCERDC, 2006-2010, grades 3-5. Dependent variable is standardized by grade and year. All specifications
include dummy variables for grade. Controls include peer absences and lagged peer score. Standard errors are
reported in parenthesis. The sample is smaller than our main estimating sample as identification relies on observing
at least two children from the same family in a given year. Significance levels: ˚ ˚ ˚ denotes 1%; ˚˚ denotes 5%; ˚
denotes 10%.
3. This suggests that family specific shocks are not driving the results.78
6.3 Health Shocks
Even after all of the controls to guard against endogeneity concerns, fixed effects do not guard
against absences that are, for example, the result of a major/chronic illness; which is an excused
absence and might be expected to have a direct effect on test scores. If this was driving our re-
sults, then after disaggregating absences into the two types, excused absences would be expected
to be more negative relative to unexcused absences.79 Given that data by type of absences is
only available for the years 2006-2008, column (1) of Table 7 replicates specification (4) from
Table 3 (i.e. the benchmark specification) but only using data prior to 2009. Results show
comparable patterns across tables.80 Specifications (2) and (3) disaggregate absences by type,
where the former does not include controls for school performance and peer absences. Both
specifications show very similar results. An additional excused absence lowers math (reading)
scores by 0.41% (0.18%) of a standard deviation–according to specification (3)–while unexcused
absences have an effect of 0.7% (0.4%) of a standard deviation. Therefore, these results indicate
that health problems do not seem to bias our results.
78To the extent that absences for children in grades 3 to 5 are mainly driven by parental decisions that may
be changing over time, then controlling for family-year fixed effects should address concerns regarding this type of
endogeneity.
79Gottfried (2009) also examines disaggregated absences and finds that students with a higher proportion of unex-
cused absences places them at academic risk, particularly in math achievement.
80As mentioned previously, absences by type are not available for the full sample during the years 2006-2008. They
are generally missing at the school level. The inclusion of three-way high-dimensional fixed effects should address any
possible missing data bias. Finally, notice that given that our specifications include school fixed effects the coefficient
on days of class are less likely to be well identified due to the fact that we are only using only three years of the
sample.
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The evidence presented in this section indicates that our baseline findings on the effect of
students’ absences on test scores performance are robust to several specifications, suggesting
that possible expected threats to our identification strategy are not driving the results.81
Table 7: Absences by Type Regression
Math Test Score Reading Test Score
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Days of Class -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0004 0.0003 0.0001
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0013)
Days Absent -0.0055*** -0.0031***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Excused Absences -0.0043*** -0.0041*** -0.0022*** -0.0018***
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Unexcused Absences -0.0074*** -0.0070*** -0.0046*** -0.0040***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0005)
Student FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Teacher FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No Yes No No Yes
N 671,148 671,148 425,082 671,148 671,148 425,082
Source: NCERDC, 2006-2008, grades 3-5. Dependent variable is standardized by grade and year. All specifications
include dummy variables for grade, year, and free/reduced price lunch status. Controls include average absences of
peers, proportion of students in the school that achieved proficiency in the previous academic year, and lagged
average performance of peers. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels: ˚ ˚ ˚
denotes 1%; ˚˚ denotes 5%; ˚ denotes 10%.
7 Heterogeneous Effects
On average, absences have a negative effect on test scores, while the positive impact of an
additional day of class within the observed range is much smaller. However, these effects may
differ based on student characteristics. As noted earlier, catching up after an absence is likely
to be more difficult for a low performing student. Understanding the heterogeneous effects of
an absence will help to inform the policy discussion by identifying groups of the population that
are likely to disproportionately benefit from particular interventions.
To examine how the effect of attending school differs by student ability, students are grouped
based on their test score from the prior year. Table 8 shows the regression results with absences
and days of class interacted with a dummy for the tercile of the prior year’s score. Score 3
denotes the highest tercile. These results indicate that students in the lowest tercile are the
most adversely affected by an additional absence; consistent with the hypothesis that lower
81We also explore the presence of non-linear effects. In this regard, we saturated the unexcused absences variable
with dummies for each day absent from 1 to 30 and another for 31 or more. The coefficients on each of this dummy
variables are plotted in Figure 5 (see appendix F). The pattern of the coefficients indicates that the effect on test
scores is in fact roughly linear through 30 absences.
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ability students have a harder time making up missed work. A similar pattern can be found
when considering days of class, i.e. low achieving students benefit the most from spending more
time at school. Finally, as was the case in our previous results, absences have a larger effect
than days of class within achievement level. In summary, the findings in Table 8 suggest that
policies aiming to extend time spent at school (either through reducing absences or extending
the school calendar) are likely to have larger impact on low achieving students, helping to close
current gaps in performance.
Table 8: Differences by Ability
Math Test Score Reading Test Score
Days Absent -0.0102*** -0.0071***
(0.0003) (0.0002)
Days Absent x Score 2 0.0016*** 0.0030***
(0.0003) (0.0004)
Days Absent x Score 3 -0.0000 0.0029***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Days of Class 0.0059*** 0.0050***
(0.0006) (0.0005)
Days of Class x Score 2 -0.0056*** -0.0039***
(0.0006) (0.0005)
Days of Class x Score 3 -0.0062*** -0.0069***
(0.0006) (0.0005)
School FE Yes Yes
Teacher FE Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
N 814,127 814,127
Source: NCERDC, 2006-2010, grades 3-5. Dependent variable is standardized by grade and year. All specifications
include dummy variables for each quartile of prior year test score, gender, grade, year, free/reduced price lunch
status, and race. Controls include average absences of peers, proportion of students in the school that achieved
proficiency in the previous academic year, and lagged average performance of peers. Bootstrapped standard errors
are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels: ˚ ˚ ˚ denotes 1%; ˚˚ denotes 5%; ˚ denotes 10%.
Table 9 further explores the relationship between absences and the quality of students,
teachers, and schools by regressing days absent on the three fixed effects obtained from one of
our baseline regressions (specification (4) in Table 3).82 As expected from our previous results,
lower ability students have more absences than their higher ability peers. However, we also find
that worse schools (teachers) have a positive relationship with absences. More specifically, an
increase in school (teacher) quality from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile is associated
82Given that the fixed effects from the math and reading regressions are different, we present two set of results (i.e.
the first column includes fixed effects from the math specification while the second column includes the fixed effects
from the reading specification).
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Table 9: Days Absent
Math Test Score Reading Test Score
Student FE -0.1767*** -0.0892***
(0.0048) (0.0045)
School FE -0.5132*** -0.4702***
(0.1275) (0.1584)
Teacher FE -0.4113*** -0.3820***
(0.0676) (0.0981)
N 1,248,496 1,248,496
Source: NCERDC, 2006-2010, grades 3-5. Dependent variable is days absent. Bootstrapped standard errors are
reported in parenthesis. Significance levels: ˚ ˚ ˚ denotes 1%; ˚˚ denotes 5%; ˚ denotes 10%.
with 0.14 (0.14) fewer days absent.83 This is a relatively large effect given the sample average
of 6.28 absences. In this regard, improving the quality of schools and teachers could not only
benefit students by providing them with a better educational environment, but may also reduce
the detrimental effects from absences.
Table 10 examines heterogeneous effects by grade. Results indicate that absences appear to
have a larger negative effect on both math and reading test scores at higher grades. While each
additional absence decreases math (reading) scores by 0.20% (0.19%) of a standard deviation in
grade 3, by grade 5 each absence has an impact about four (two) times larger. It is difficult to
determine the exact mechanism behind this finding. However a possible explanation could be
that school subjects are more complex in higher grades, therefore parents may become less able
to help their child to catch up. Similarly, one might expect that more subject matter is taught
in grade 5 than in grade 3, making more costly to learn the missed material.84
In order to further assess the effect of missing a school day at different stages of the schooling
career, we examine “long-term” effects of absences (i.e. impact of school absences at an early
grade on performance in subsequent grades). We study persistence effect of absences by following
two different approaches. First, we obtain the ratio of coefficients (on absences) from regressions
at different points in time [see Jacob, Lefgren, and Sims (2010)]. More specifically, we estimate
the impact of previous year absences on contemporaneous test scores, and then in a second
regression we estimate a similar specification but instead of including contemporaneous absences
we include lagged absences. The ratio of the absences coefficient from the first regression to
the analogous coefficient in the second regression provides a (simple) approximation of the one-
83This result corresponds to the specification that includes the fixed effects obtained from the regressions that use
as dependent variable math test score.
84However, we should also acknowledge that students’ capacity to learn also increases with age.
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Table 10: Differences by Grade
Math Test Score Reading Test Score
Days Absent -0.0020*** -0.0019***
(0.0003) (0.0005)
Days Absent x Grade 4 -0.0027*** -0.0008**
(0.0003) (0.0004)
Days Absent x Grade 5 -0.0061*** -0.0019***
(0.0003) (0.0004)
Days of Class -0.0006 -0.0007
(0.0014) (0.0014)
Days of Class x Grade 4 0.0011 0.0006
(0.0013) (0.0014)
Days of Class x Grade 5 0.0039** 0.0029**
(0.0016) (0.0014)
Student FE Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes
Teacher FE Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
N 814,127 814,127
Source: NCERDC, 2006-2010, grades 3-5. Dependent variable is standardized by grade and year. All specifications
include dummy variables for grade, year, free/reduced price lunch status. Controls include peer absences, lagged
peer score and lagged school percent proficiency. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Significance levels: ˚ ˚ ˚ denotes 1%; ˚˚ denotes 5%; ˚ denotes 10%.
year persistence effect of absences.85 In our second approach, we simultaneously control for
contemporaneous absences and previous year absences. Table 11 shows the results from these
specifications for math and reading, where our sample of analysis are fifth graders.86 The ratio
of the coefficients in columns (1) and (2) provides a measure of persistence based on the first
approach, while column (3) shows “long-term” effects based on the second approach. Results
indicate a likely persistent effect of absences in math, that ranges from 60% to 22%, while in
reading the presence of “long-term” effects depends on the specification.87 Overall, these results
suggest that previous year absences are likely to have an impact in subsequent grades, providing
an additional reason to focus on problems related to school attendance.
Finally, we analyze whether lower income students experience different effects from absences
relative to their wealthier classmates. This may be due to parents not having the same amount of
85A similar approach has been followed by Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2014) but in the context of analyzing
long term effects of teacher value added. Note that in our case, the implicit assumption is that twice-lagged test score
performance accounts for student unobserved heterogeneity.
86Note that the sample size is smaller than in Table 3 specification (7) due to the fact that Table 11 only includes
students in grade 5.
87Due to little variation in days of class given the sample that we are using, the lag of the days of class coefficient
does not provide any interesting result.
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Table 11: Persistent Effect of Absences
Math Test Score Reading Test Score
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Days Absent -0.0100*** -0.0088*** -0.0042*** -0.0041***
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007)
Lagged Days Absent -0.0062** -0.0020*** -0.0020*** -0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007)
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Teacher FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 47,736 47,736 47,736 47,736 47,736 47,736
Source: NCERDC, 2006-2010, grade 5. Dependent variable is standardized by year. All specifications include third
grade standardized test score, free/reduced price lunch status in the third grade, as well as dummy variables for
grade, year, gender and race. Controls include peer absences, lagged peer score and lagged school percent
proficiency. Specifications (2) and (3) include days of class. Specifications (1) and (3) include lagged days of class.
Significance levels: ˚ ˚ ˚ denotes 1%; ˚˚ denotes 5%; ˚ denotes 10%.
time and/or resources to help their child with homework. Examining the effects by free/reduced
price lunch subsidy program status in Table 12, we find that missing school days have larger
deleterious effects on test scores for low income students. For example, the effect of an absence
(extra day of class) on a relatively poor student has an additional effect of -0.12% (0.15%) of a
standard deviation in math.88
Overall, the results from this section show the presence of important heterogeneous effects of
time spent at school. Low achieving students or those coming from less wealthy families would
benefit the most from having fewer absences or attending school for a greater number of days
during the year. Therefore, these findings indicate that increasing instructional time (mainly
by decreasing absences) most likely will contribute to closing gaps in performance.89
8 Conclusions
This paper jointly estimates the relative effectiveness of reducing absences to extending the
school calendar on test score performance. Despite the fact that many policy makers have fo-
cused their attention on extending the school calendar, the evidence presented in this manuscript
indicates that targeting absenteeism could constitute a more effective intervention. First, our
empirical strategy shows that the effect of reducing absences relative to extending the number
88We also studied heterogeneous effects across race and gender, but we did not find statistically significant results.
89Despite the fact that extending the number of school days does not show large effects on schooling outcomes,
this does not preclude of possible complementarities between policies that simultaneously target absenteeism and
the length of the school year. For instance, extending the school calendar could make possible the inclusion of more
extracurricular activities that indirectly reduce absenteeism. See Cuffe, Bignell, and Waddell (2014) for an example
on how extracurricular activities can reduce absenteeism.
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Table 12: Differences by Free/Reduced Price Lunch Status
Math Test Score Reading Test Score
Absences -0.0048*** -0.0025***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Absences x FRL -0.0012*** -0.0008***
(0.0004) (0.0003)
Days of Class 0.0010* -0.0008
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Days of Class x FRL 0.0015*** 0.0035***
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Student FE Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes
Teacher FE Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
N 814,127 814,127
Source: NCERDC, 2006-2010, grades 3-5. Dependent variable is standardized by grade and year. All specifications
include dummy variables for grade, year, free/reduced price lunch status. Controls include peer absences, lagged
peer score and lagged school percent proficiency. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
Significance levels: ˚ ˚ ˚ denotes 1%; ˚˚ denotes 5%; ˚ denotes 10%.
of school days is substantially higher. Our preferred specification indicates that extending the
school calendar by ten days would increase math and reading test scores by only 1.7% and
0.8% of a standard deviation, respectively; while a similar reduction in absences would lead to
increases of 5.5% and 2.9% in math and reading, respectively. Moreover, we show that the large
effect of absences on test score performance holds even after performing many robustness checks
(i.e. use of family-year fixed effects, utilizing flu data to instrument for absences, distinguish-
ing between excused and unexcused absences, and controlling for a contemporaneous measure
of student disengagement). Second, results point to the presence of important heterogeneous
effects. Missing a school day due to an absence in grade 5 is three times more detrimental than
in grade 3 in math, and more importantly, low performing kids benefit the most from additional
instructional time. The fact that reducing absenteeism can target specific students who would
benefit the most from being in the classroom, not only suggests this type of initiative could be
more effective than just extending the school calendar, but could also contribute to narrowing
current achievement gaps.
Estimation results also suggest that improving both school and teacher quality from the 25th
percentile to the 75th percentile would decrease the average number of absences by about 4.5%.
Therefore, policies aiming to improve the quality of schools and teachers could not only benefit
students by providing them with a better educational environment, but also by reducing the
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detrimental effects from absences.
The financial resources needed to extend the school calendar are high. Most calculations
suggest that a ten percent increase in time would require a six to seven percent increase in cost
[Chalkboard Project (2008), Silva (2007)]. This type of policy is even more difficult to implement
in the context of decreasing per student public education spending.90 Therefore, while many
policymakers have focused their attention on extending the school calendar, the fact that a
competing policy, like targeting absenteeism on specific groups of students may lead to large
improvements in academic performance,91 points towards an avenue of policy that deserves far
greater attention.
Finally, we believe that future work should focus on understanding what type of interventions
are the most effective at boosting school attendance. For example, it remains as an open question
whether implementing extracurricular activities that engage students with school life [see, for
example, Cuffe, Bignell, and Waddell (2014)] constitute a more effective policy than making
phone calls to students with pre-recorded wake up messages from celebrities, like in the WakeUp!
NYC program.
90Public Education Finances: 2011, U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/govs/school/
91For example, the program “WakeUp! NYC” has been implemented using media tools (i.e. SchoolMessenger)
that has already been incorporated in large number of schools for other purposes.
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9 Appendix A
Figure 3: Variation in Days of Class within School
10 Appendix B
Estimating Equation (1) by ordinary least squares solves:
min
βr,α,θ,δ
Nÿ
i“1
Kÿ
k“1
Sÿ
s“1
pyigkst´β0´β1ait´β2dist´β3Xit´β4Gig´β5Tt´β6Est´αi´θk´δsq2 (2)
The following estimation method yields OLS estimates of the parameters of interest while cir-
cumventing the dimensionality problem. The algorithm begins with an initial guess of the
parameters α
p0q
i , θ
p0q
k , δ
p0q
s . It then iterates on the following steps with the mth iteration:
• Step 1: Using the initial guesses for the student, teacher, and school fixed effects, calculate
Z
pmq
igkst “ yigkst ´ αpmqi ´ θpmqk ´ δpmqs and solve the least squares problem:
!
β
1pmq
0 , β
1pmq
1 , β
1pmq
2 , β
1pmq
3 , β
1pmq
4 , β
1pmq
5 , β
1pmq
6
)
“
arg min
β
Nÿ
i“1
Kÿ
k“1
Sÿ
s“1
pZpmqigkst ´ β0 ´ β1ait ´ β2dist ´ β3Xit ´ β4Gig ´ β5Tt ´ β6Estq2
• Step 2: Using
!
β
1pmq
0 , β
1pmq
1 , β
1pmq
2 , β
1pmq
3 , β
1pmq
4 , β
1pmq
5 , β
1pmq
6 , θ
pmq
k , δ
pmq
s
)
calculate α
pm`1q
i
based on the following expression (ni denotes number of observations for student i)
36
α
pm`1q
i “
1
ni
»—–
ř
kPi
pyigkst ´ β
1pmq
0 ´ β
1pmq
1 ait ´ β
1pmq
2 dist
´ β1pmq3 Xit ´ β
1pmq
4 Gig ´ β
1pmq
5 Tt ´ β
1pmq
6 Est ´ θpmqk ´ δpmqs q
fiffifl
where the previous expression avoids the minimization over all the α1is. Notice that this ex-
pression is obtained from the first order condition of the least squares problem with respect to
αi
• Step 3: Using
!
β
1pmq
0 , β
1pmq
1 , β
1pmq
2 , β
1pmq
3 , β
1pmq
4 , β
1pmq
5 , β
1pmq
6 , α
pm`1q
i , δ
pmq
s
)
calculate θ
pm`1q
k
in an analogous way to step 2.
• Step 4: Using
!
β
1pmq
0 , β
1pmq
1 , β
1pmq
2 , β
1pmq
3 , β
1pmq
4 , β
1pmq
5 , β
1pmq
6 , α
pm`1q
i , θ
pm`1q
k
)
calculate δ
pm`1q
s
in an analogous way to step 2.
• Step 5: Repeat steps 1 to 4 until convergence of the parameters.
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Table 13: Baseline Regression: Alternative Specification
Math Test Score Reading Test Score
Days Absent/Days of Class -0.9141*** -0.4909***
(0.0319) (0.0416)
Days of Class 0.0015*** 0.0007
(0.0005) (0.0007)
Student FE Yes Yes
School FE Yes Yes
Teacher FE Yes Yes
Lagged Student Score No No
N 814,127 814,127
Source: NCERDC, 2006-2010, grades 3-5. The dependent variable denotes number of days absent divided by days
of class. This variable variable is standardized by grade and year. All specifications include peer absences, lagged
peer score, and lagged school percent proficiency, as well as dummy variables for grade, year, and free/reduced price
lunch status. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels: ˚ ˚ ˚ denotes 1%; ˚˚
denotes 5%; ˚ denotes 10%.
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Table 14: Baseline Regression: Teacher Absences
Math Test Score Reading Test Score
Days Absent -0.0047*** -0.0047*** -0.0027*** -0.0027***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Days of Class 0.0002 0.0002 -00016 -0.0016
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Teacher Sick Days -0.0011*** -0.0007*
(0.0003) (0.0004)
School FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Teacher FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged Student Score Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 370,438 370,438 370,438 370,438
Source: NCERDC, 2006-2008, grades 3-5. Dependent variable is standardized by grade and year. All specifications
include dummy variables for grade, year, gender, race, and free/reduced price lunch status. Bootstrapped standard
errors are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels: ˚ ˚ ˚ denotes 1%; ˚˚ denotes 5%; ˚ denotes 10%. Notice that
this specification only uses data from years 2006-2008, therefore there is less variability in the number of school days
over time, explaining the lack of significance in “days of class.”
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Table 15: IV: First Stage
Days Absent
County ILI 0.0011*** 0.0011***
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Lagged Math Score X
Lagged Reading Score X
N 284,651 284,651
Source: NCERDC, 2009-2010, grades 3-5. Include lagged test score, days of class, lagged peer test score, lagged
school percent proficiency, and dummy variables for grade, year, gender, race, and free/reduced price lunch status.
Standard errors clustered at the classroom-year level are reported in parenthesis. Significance levels: ˚ ˚ ˚ denotes
1%; ˚˚ denotes 5%; ˚ denotes 10%.
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Figure 4: Distribution of County ILI per 10,000 Students, 2010
14 Appendix F
Figure 5: Coefficients on Unexcused Days Absent Dummy Variables.
These coefficients are obtained after controlling for student heterogeneity with math scores as the dependent
variable. Similar results are obtained with reading scores. The last coefficient denotes 31 or more days absent.
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